Tag Archives: Public safety

Security in connection with football matches with an international dimension

Outline of the Community (European Union) legislation about Security in connection with football matches with an international dimension

Topics

These categories group together and put in context the legislative and non-legislative initiatives which deal with the same topic.

Education training youth sport > Sport

Security in connection with football matches with an international dimension

Document or Iniciative

Council Decision 2002/348/JHA of 25 April 2002 concerning security in connection with football matches with an international dimension [See amending act(s)].

Summary

Adopted on the initiative of the Kingdom of Belgium, this decision provides for a national football information centre to be set up and run by the police in each Member State. Member States must forward the details of their national centre to the General Secretariat of the Council. In addition, they must ensure that their national centre has the staff and technical equipment necessary to fulfil its duties effectively and rapidly.

The national football information centres are responsible for:

gathering, coordinating and exchanging strategic, operational and tactical information on football matches with an international dimension;
coordinating and organising cooperation between national police authorities;
risk assessment in respect of their own country’s clubs and national team;
generic/thematic disorder assessments of their national football situation.

The national football information centre of the Member State organising the football event cooperates with the police force of the country concerned. All exchanged reports are kept on record for consultation by other interested national information centres. The national centre that provided the information must be consulted before any data is released.

The handbook for international police cooperation and measures to prevent and control violence and disorder around football matches provides the forms for the exchange of information.

The exchange of personal data must take place in accordance with the Convention of the Council of Europe of 28 January 1981 for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data.

National football information centres communicate in their national language, with a translation in a working language common to the parties concerned, unless they have arranged otherwise.

References

Act	Entry into force	Deadline for transposition in the Member States	Official Journal
Decision 2002/348/JHA	9.5.2002	–	OJ L 121 of 8.5.2002

Amending act(s)	Entry into force	Deadline for transposition in the Member States	Official Journal
Decision 2007/412/JHA	16.6.2007	–	OJ L 155 of 15.6.2007

Related Acts

Council Resolution of 4 December 2006 concerning an updated handbook with recommendations for international police cooperation and measures to prevent and control violence and disturbances in connection with football matches with an international dimension, in which at least one Member State is involved [Official Journal C 322 of 29.12.2006].

Council Resolution of 17 November 2003 on the use by Member States of bans on access to venues of football matches with an international dimension [Official Journal C 281 of 22.11.2003].

Public procurement in the fields of defence and security

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Public procurement in the fields of defence and security

Outline of the Community (European Union) legislation about Public procurement in the fields of defence and security

Topics

These categories group together and put in context the legislative and non-legislative initiatives which deal with the same topic.

Internal market > Businesses in the internal market > Public procurement

Public procurement in the fields of defence and security

Document or Iniciative

Directive 2009/81/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on the coordination of procedures for the award of certain works contracts, supply contracts and service contracts by contracting authorities or entities in the fields of defence and security, and amending Directives 2004/17/EC and 2004/18/EC (Text with EEA relevance). [See amending act(s)].

Summary

This Directive applies to public contracts in the fields of defence and security for:

the supply of military equipment;
the supply of sensitive equipment;
works, supplies and services directly related to military or sensitive equipment;
works and services for specifically military purposes or sensitive works and sensitive services.

Public procurement

Economic operators, whether they are natural or legal persons, can participate in invitations to tender in these fields. Groups of economic operators may also participate. If a contract is awarded to them, they may be required to assume a specific legal form.

Market thresholds and exclusions

This Directive shall apply to contracts which have a value excluding value-added tax (VAT) estimated to be no less than the following thresholds:

EUR 400,000 for supply and service contracts;
EUR 5,000,000 in the case of works contracts.

Exclusions

Certain specific contracts are excluded from the scope of this Directive, including:

contracts governed by specific procedural rules pursuant to an international agreement or arrangement between Member States and third countries and markets governed by the specific procedural rules of an international organisation purchasing for its purposes;
contracts for which the application of the rules of this Directive would oblige a Member State to supply certain information the disclosure of which it considers contrary to the essential interests of its security;
contracts awarded in the framework of a cooperation programme aimed at developing a new system;
contracts for the purposes of intelligence activities;
contracts awarded in a third country when forces are deployed outside the territory of the Union and transactions take place in the area of operations;
contracts relating to immovable property;
contracts awarded between governments.

Procedures

Contracting authorities/entities shall apply national procedures for the award of public contracts adjusted for the purposes of this Directive, by using the restricted procedure or the negotiated procedure with publication of a contract notice. An open procedure cannot be chosen.

Member States may use a competitive dialogue in the case of particularly complex contracts. In this case, contracting authorities/entities open a dialogue with the candidates selected in order to identify and define the means best suited to satisfying their needs.

There are also exceptional cases in which it is possible to use the negotiated procedure without publication of a contract notice.

The procedures are adjusted for the specific purposes of this Directive, in particular by proposing specific rules for the security of information, the security of supply and subcontracting.

The contracting authorities/entities may also conclude framework agreements, the duration of which may not exceed seven years. They must not, however, restrict competition.

Rules on advertising and transparency

Contracting authorities/entities may publish a prior information notice on their buyer profiles or on Tenders Electronic Daily (TED). They are obliged to publish a contract notice on TED with the sole exception of an exceptional negotiated procedure without publication of a contract notice.

In the case of restricted or negotiated procedures, contracting authorities/entities shall invite the selected candidates to submit their tenders and to negotiate. They shall also be invited to negotiate under the negotiated procedure. This invitation shall include contract documents, the deadline for receipt of tenders and an indication of any documents to be annexed.

For every contract or framework agreement, the contracting authorities/entities must draw up a written report describing the selection procedure chosen as well as information concerning the candidates.

Contract award criteria

Contracting authorities/entities shall award contracts on the basis of:

the most economically advantageous tender. Award shall then be based on various criteria linked to the subject-matter of the contract in question, such as quality, price or technical merit); or
the lowest price.

Subcontracting

Contracting authorities/entities may oblige the successful tenderer to organise a transparent and non-discriminatory competition when awarding subcontracts to third parties.

In addition, Member States may allow or require their contracting authorities/entities to ask that subcontracts representing at least a certain share of the value of the contract (a maximum of 30 %) be awarded to third parties following a transparent and non-discriminatory competition.

Review

A review of a decision taken by contracting authorities/entities may be sought in the event of an infringement of Community law. Member States must ensure that any operator that has suffered harm has access to effective and rapid rights to review. They may require that operators who wish to seek review either inform the contracting authority or first seek review from it.

During a review procedure, interim or final measures may be taken. In both cases, damages shall be granted to the persons concerned.

Context

The 2005 Green Paper on defence procurement highlighted the fact that it was essential to create a European market for defence equipment. This Directive should prove to be an appropriate legislative framework since it meets the specific requirements relating to goods and services in the fields of defence and security.

Reference

Act	Entry into force	Deadline for transposition in the Member States	Official Journal
Directive 2009/81/EC	21.8.2009	21.8.2011	OJ L216, 20.8.2009

Amending act(s)	Entry into force	Deadline for transposition in the Member States	Official Journal
Regulation (EC) No 1177/2009	1.1.2010	–	OJ L 314, 1.12.2009
Regulation (EU) No 1251/2011	2.12.2011	–	OJ L 319, 2.12.2011

Successive amendments and corrections to Directive 2009/81/EC have been incorporated into the original text. This consolidated version is for reference only.

Cooperation between special intervention units

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Cooperation between special intervention units

Outline of the Community (European Union) legislation about Cooperation between special intervention units

Topics

These categories group together and put in context the legislative and non-legislative initiatives which deal with the same topic.

Justice freedom and security > Police and customs cooperation

Cooperation between special intervention units

Document or Iniciative

Council Decision 2008/617/JHA of 23 June 2008 on the improvement of cooperation between the special intervention units of the Member States of the European Union in crisis situations.

Summary

This Decision sets out the general rules and conditions for the cooperation of Member States’ special intervention units* in situations of crisis*. Cooperation is based on the provision of assistance and/or on the carrying out of operations on the territory of the requesting Member State. The details for implementing the practical aspects of the cooperation are settled between the requesting and the requested Member States directly.

The competent authority* of a Member State processes the request for assistance from another Member State’s special intervention unit. The request must specify the nature of and the operational necessity for the assistance. The requested Member State’s competent authority may either accept or refuse the request, or propose assistance in another form.

The assistance provided may consist of:

equipment;
expertise;
carrying out operations on the requesting Member State’s territory.

When carrying out operations, the requested Member State’s special intervention unit has a supporting role. It is to provide the assistance under the responsibility, authority and direction of the requesting Member State. While the operations fall under the jurisdiction of the requesting Member State, the requested Member State’s officers may act only within the limits of their powers as defined by their national law.

The Member States taking part in this form of cooperation must ensure that experience, expertise and information on managing crisis situations are exchanged. To this end, the special intervention units are to hold meetings and joint trainings and exercises. These may be funded from certain Community financial programmes. Hence, the responsibility for the organisation of these events lies with the Member State holding the Presidency of the Council of the European Union. All operational costs however, including those of the requested Member State’s special intervention unit, are to be borne by the requesting Member State, unless the cooperating Member States decide otherwise.

An up-to-date list of the Member States’ competent authorities is maintained by the General Secretariat of the Council.

Background

The Council Declaration on Solidarity against Terrorism of 25 March 2004 established the basis for cooperation between Member States in the event of terrorist attacks.

Council Decision 2008/617/JHA complements Council Decision 2008/615/JHA of 23 June 2008 on the stepping up of cross-border cooperation, particularly in combating terrorism and cross-border crime, whose article 18 lays down the obligation for Member States to provide one another assistance in connection with mass gatherings, disasters and serious accidents.

Key terms used in the act

Special intervention unit: any law enforcement unit of a Member State that is specialised in the control of a crisis situation.
Crisis situation: any situation in which the competent authorities of a Member State have reasonable grounds to believe that there is a criminal offence presenting a serious direct physical threat to persons, property, infrastructure or institutions of that Member State.
Competent authority: the national authority that may make requests and give authorisations regarding the deployment of the special intervention units.

References

Act	Entry into force	Deadline for transposition in the Member States	Official Journal
Decision 2008/617/JHA	23.12.2008	–	OJ L 210 of 6.8.2008

Second generation Schengen Information System – former 1st pillar regulation

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Second generation Schengen Information System – former 1st pillar regulation

Outline of the Community (European Union) legislation about Second generation Schengen Information System – former 1st pillar regulation

Topics

These categories group together and put in context the legislative and non-legislative initiatives which deal with the same topic.

Justice freedom and security > Free movement of persons asylum and immigration

Second generation Schengen Information System (SIS II) – former 1st pillar regulation

The SIS II Regulation lays down the technical aspects and the operation of SIS II, the conditions for issuing alerts on refusal of entry or stay for non-EU nationals, the processing of data relating to alerts, and conditions of data access and protection. It constitutes the legislative basis for governing SIS II with respect to matters falling under Title IV of the Treaty establishing the European Community (former first pillar).

Document or Iniciative

Regulation (EC) No 1987/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 December 2006 on the establishment, operation and use of the second-generation Schengen Information System (SIS II).

Summary

The second generation Schengen Information System (SIS II) will be a large-scale information system containing alerts * on persons and objects. It will be used by border guards, customs officers, visa- and law-enforcement authorities throughout the Schengen area, with a view to ensuring a high level of security. This new system is currently undergoing extensive testing in close cooperation with European Union (EU) countries and associated countries participating in the Schengen area (referred to below as the Member States *) and will replace the current system, providing enhanced functionalities.

The SIS II Regulation constitutes the necessary legislative basis for governing SIS II with respect to alert procedures falling under Title IV of the Treaty establishing the European Community (former first pillar). It is supplemented by a decision relating to procedures falling under Title VI of the Treaty on European Union (former third pillar).

Technical architecture and ways of operating SIS II

SIS II will be composed of:

a central system (“Central SIS II”);
a national system (the “N.SIS II”) in each Member State (the national data systems that will communicate with the Central SIS II);
a communication infrastructure between the central system and the national systems providing an encrypted virtual network dedicated to SIS II data and the exchange of data between the authorities responsible for the exchange of all supplementary information * (SIRENE Bureaux).

SIS II data will be entered, updated, deleted and searched via the various national systems. The central system, which will perform technical supervision and administration functions, is located in Strasbourg (France). It will provide the necessary services for the entry and processing of SIS II data. A backup central system, capable of ensuring all functionalities of the principal central system in the event of failure of this system, is located near Salzburg (Austria). Each Member State will be responsible for setting up, operating and maintaining its own national system and for connecting it to the central system. It designates an authority, the national SIS II office (N.SIS II office), which has central responsibility for its national SIS II project. This authority will be responsible for the smooth operation and security of its national system.

Each Member State designates its SIRENE Bureau. Supplementary information relating to SIS II alerts will be exchanged in accordance with the provisions of the “SIRENE Manual” and by using the communication infrastructure. Member States will keep a reference to the decisions giving rise to an alert at the SIRENE Bureau.

Member States will be liable for any damage caused to a person through the use of the national SIS II systems. They will also ensure that any potential misuse of data entered in SIS II or any exchange of supplementary information contrary to this regulation will be subject to effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties.

Operational management of the Central SIS II will consist of all the necessary tasks for keeping it running 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, in accordance with this regulation.

After a transitional period, a management authority, funded from the general budget of the EU, shall be responsible for the operational management of the Central SIS II and for a number of tasks relating to the communication infrastructure (supervision, security and coordination of relations between Member States and the provider). The Commission will be responsible for all other tasks relating to the communication infrastructure.

During a transitional period before the management authority takes up its responsibilities, the Commission shall be responsible for the operational management of Central SIS II. In accordance with the Financial Regulation applicable to the general budget of the European Communities, the Commission may delegate the operational management and tasks relating to implementation of the budget to national public-sector bodies in two different countries that meet the specific criteria outlined in Article 15, paragraph 4 of the SIS II Regulation.

The regulation contains provisions to ensure adequate protection of personal data. In cooperation with the national supervisory authorities and the European Data Protection Supervisor, the Commission will accompany the start of the operation of SIS II with an information campaign informing the public about the objectives, the data stored, the authorities having access and the rights of individuals.

Alerts issued in respect of non-EU nationals for the purpose of refusing entry and stay

SIS II will only contain those categories of data supplied by each of the Member States, which are necessary for alerts for refusing entry or stay. Once the system is operational and alerts are included in it, the SIS II will only be possible to store the following information on persons for whom an alert has been issued: surname(s) and forename(s), name(s) at birth, aliases, specific physical characteristics, place and date of birth, sex, photographs, fingerprints, nationality(ies), whether the person concerned is armed, violent or has escaped, reason for the alert, authority issuing the alert, a reference to the decision giving rise to the alert and link(s) to other alerts issued in SIS II. It will also include the action to be taken in the event that there is a “hit” (i.e. if a competent national authority finds an alert in SIS II concerning a non-EU national on whom they have carried out a check). Should a Member State be unable to perform the requested action after obtaining a hit in SIS II, it will immediately inform the Member State that issued the alert.

Photographs and fingerprints will be used to confirm the identity of a non-EU national who has been located as a result of an alphanumeric search made in SIS II. As soon as this becomes technically possible, fingerprints may also be used to allow identification of a non-EU national on the basis of his/her biometric identifier. Before this functionality is implemented in SIS II, the Commission will present a report on the availability and readiness of the required technology.

Data on non-EU nationals, for whom an alert has been issued for refusing entry or stay, will be entered on the basis of a national alert based on a decision by the competent courts and administrative authorities taken on the basis of an individual assessment. An alert will be entered where the decision is based on a threat to public policy, to public security or to national security, which the presence of the non-EU national in question in the territory of a Member State may pose. It will also be possible to enter an alert when the decision is based on the fact that the non-EU national has been subject to a measure involving expulsion.

Access to and processing of data in SIS II

Authorities responsible for border control and other police and customs checks within the Member State concerned will have a right to access alerts. By extension, it will also be possible for national judicial authorities to access the system for the performance of their tasks. In any case, users will only be able to access data that is required for the performance of their tasks.

Before issuing an alert, Member States will determine whether the case is relevant enough to warrant the entry of the alert in SIS II. These alerts will only be kept for the time required to achieve the purposes for which they were entered. A Member State issuing an alert shall review the need to keep it within three years of its entry in SIS II.

It will only be possible to copy data for technical purposes. Such copies, which lead to off-line databases, may be retained for no more than 48 hours. It will not be possible to use data for administrative purposes.

A Member State issuing an alert will be responsible for ensuring that the data are accurate, up-to-date and lawfully entered in SIS II. Only the Member State issuing an alert will be authorised to modify, add to, correct, update or delete data that it has entered. If a Member State other than that issuing an alert obtains evidence suggesting that an item of data is incorrect, it will inform the Member State that issued the alert as soon as possible. The Member State that issued the alert will check the communication and, if necessary, correct or delete the item in question without delay. If the Member States are unable to reach an agreement within two months, the Member State that did not issue the alert will submit the matter to the European Data Protection Supervisor who will act as a mediator, jointly with the national supervisory authorities concerned.

It will be possible for a Member State to create a link between alerts it enters in SIS II, but this should only be done when there is a clear operational need.

Data processed in SIS II will not be transferred or made available to non-EU countries or to international organisations.

Data protection

Processing of sensitive categories of data (personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs or trade-union membership and data concerning health or sex life) will be prohibited.

Any person will have the right to request access to data relating to him/her (personal data *) that has been entered in SIS II, and to have factually inaccurate personal data corrected or unlawfully stored personal data deleted.

Information may not be communicated to the data subject if this is indispensable for the performance of a task in connection with an alert or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of third parties. Regarding the exercise of their rights of correction and deletion, individuals will be informed about the follow-up as soon as possible, and in any event no later than three months from the date of their application for correction or deletion.

It will be possible for any person to bring an action before the competent courts or authorities to access, correct, delete, or obtain information or compensation in connection with an alert relating to him/her.

The authority or authorities designated in each Member State, endowed with the powers referred to in Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, will independently monitor the lawfulness of the processing of SIS II personal data on their territory and the transmission of this data from their territory. They will ensure that an audit of the data-processing operations in the N.SIS II is carried out at least every four years.

The European Data Protection Supervisor will check that the personal data-processing activities of the management authority are carried out in accordance with this regulation. S/he will also ensure that an audit of the personal data-processing activities is carried out at least every four years. A report of this audit will be sent to the European Parliament, the Council, the management authority, the Commission and the national supervisory authorities.

The national supervisory authorities and the European Data Protection Supervisor cooperate actively. They exchange relevant information, assist one another and meet at least twice a year.

Final provisions

The regulation will apply to the Member States participating in the current Schengen Information System (SIS 1+) from the date to be set by the Council (acting by unanimity of its members representing the governments of the Member States participating in SIS 1+) once all necessary technical preparations for SIS II have been completed at central and Member State level and once all implementing measures have been adopted. Precise information on this matter is given in Article 55 of the regulation and in the legal instruments governing migration from SIS 1+ to SIS II.

Three years after the SIS II is brought into operation, and then every four years, the Commission will produce an overall evaluation of the Central SIS II and the bilateral and multilateral exchanges of supplementary information between Member States. It will transmit the evaluation to the European Parliament and the Council.

Key terms used in the act
Alert: a set of data entered in SIS II allowing the competent authorities to identify a person with a view to taking specific action. Member States: EU countries and associated countries participating in the Schengen area. The United Kingdom and Ireland are not participating in aspects of SIS II falling under this regulation. Supplementary information: information not stored in SIS II, but connected to SIS II alerts, which is to be exchanged, in order to allow Member States to consult or inform each other in the following cases: when entering an alert, following a hit in order to allow the appropriate action to be taken, when the required action cannot be taken, when dealing with the quality of SIS II data, when dealing with the compatibility and priority of alerts, when dealing with the right of access. Additional data: data stored in SIS II and connected with SIS II alerts, which are to be made immediately available to the competent authorities of a Member State where a person in relation to whom data has been entered in SIS II is located as a result of searches made there. Personal data: any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person. Processing of personal data: any operation or set of operations, which is performed upon personal data, whether or not by automatic means, such as: collection, recording, organisation, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available, alignment or combination, blocking, erasure or destruction.

Key terms used in the act

Alert: a set of data entered in SIS II allowing the competent authorities to identify a person with a view to taking specific action.
Member States: EU countries and associated countries participating in the Schengen area. The United Kingdom and Ireland are not participating in aspects of SIS II falling under this regulation.
Supplementary information: information not stored in SIS II, but connected to SIS II alerts, which is to be exchanged, in order to allow Member States to consult or inform each other in the following cases: when entering an alert, following a hit in order to allow the appropriate action to be taken, when the required action cannot be taken, when dealing with the quality of SIS II data, when dealing with the compatibility and priority of alerts, when dealing with the right of access.
Additional data: data stored in SIS II and connected with SIS II alerts, which are to be made immediately available to the competent authorities of a Member State where a person in relation to whom data has been entered in SIS II is located as a result of searches made there.
Personal data: any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person.
Processing of personal data: any operation or set of operations, which is performed upon personal data, whether or not by automatic means, such as: collection, recording, organisation, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available, alignment or combination, blocking, erasure or destruction.

References

Act	Entry into force	Deadline for transposition in the Member States	Official Journal
Regulation No 1987/2006/EC	17.1.2007	–	OJ L 381 of 28.12.2006

Related Acts

Commission Decision 2010/261/EU of 4 May 2010 on the Security Plan for Central SIS II and the Communication Infrastructure [Official Journal L 112 of 5.5.2010].
This decision provides for the organisation of the security of the Central SIS II and its communication infrastructure, and establishes a security plan for both. The purpose is to ensure protection against any threats to their availability, integrity and confidentiality. The Commission is responsible for implementing and monitoring the security measures for the communication infrastructure and, during the transitional period, for the Central SIS II. Once the management authority becomes operational, it must adopt its own security plan for the Central SIS II.
For monitoring the implementation of the security measures, the Commission designates a System Security Officer. A Local Security Officer is designated for the Central SIS II and for the communication infrastructure. They are responsible for implementing and monitoring the security measures and procedures in the principal CS-SIS, including the backup CS-SIS, and in the communication infrastructure respectively.
The System Security Officer, in cooperation with the Local Security Officers, prepares a security policy that provides detailed measures and procedures for protecting the Central SIS II and the communication infrastructure. Among others, the policy provides measures for controlling:

access to data processing facilities;
removable media containing data and any other important assets;
storage of data;
passwords;
access to SIS II hardware and software;
communications through the communication infrastructure.

It also lays down security measures in relation to human resources, defining for example the functions and responsibilities of staff that have access to the Central SIS II.

Commission Decision 2008/333/EC of 4 March 2008 adopting the SIRENE Manual and other implementing measures for the second generation Schengen Information System (SIS II) [Official Journal L 123 of 08.05.2008].
The alerts in SIS II will contain a set of data that is absolutely necessary for identification of a person or object sought. In cases where the future end-users (officers from the competent national authorities) need to take action after obtaining a matching alert, they will require supplementary information on this alert (information that will not be contained in SIS II, but that will be connected to SIS II alerts).
National offices known as SIRENE Bureaux (Supplementary Information Request at the National Entries) have been set up in all Schengen countries to assist with obtaining supplementary information for SIS by acting as the contact points between a Member State creating an alert and one achieving the match. The same offices will be used for SIS II.
The SIRENE Manual is a set of instructions indicating both the general and specific procedures that competent authorities will have to follow for exchanging supplementary information on the following categories of alerts:

alerts for refusal of entry or stay (first pillar);
alerts for arrest for surrender or extradition purposes (this and the following categories fall under the third pillar);
alerts on missing persons;
alerts sought for a judicial procedure;
alerts for discreet and specific checks;
alerts on objects for seizure or use as evidence.

The purpose will be to assure communication among Member States, in particular when entering an alert, acting on an alert, handling multiple alerts, and dealing with the quality of SIS II data or with rights of access.
The implementing measures cover SIS II aspects that, due to their technical nature, level of detail and need for regular updating, are not covered exhaustively by the SIS II legal instruments.
As is the case for other instruments related to SIS II, there are two legal instruments (Commission decisions) for the SIRENE Manual and implementing measures: one for the first pillar (Annex of Decision 2008/333/JHA) and one for the third pillar (Annex of Decision 2008/334/JHA). The Annexes to both decisions are identical.

Information management in the area of freedom, security and justice

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Information management in the area of freedom, security and justice

Outline of the Community (European Union) legislation about Information management in the area of freedom, security and justice

Topics

These categories group together and put in context the legislative and non-legislative initiatives which deal with the same topic.

Justice freedom and security > Police and customs cooperation

Information management in the area of freedom, security and justice

Document or Iniciative

Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council of 20 July 2010 – Overview of information management in the area of freedom, security and justice [COM(2010) 385 final – Not published in the Official Journal].

Summary

The communication presents an overview of European Union (EU) level instruments that regulate the collection, storage or cross-border exchange of personal data for law enforcement or migration management purposes. It describes the main purpose and structure of these instruments, as well as the types of personal data they cover, the authorities that have access to these data and the rules for data protection and retention. It also sets out the main principles to take into consideration when designing and evaluating such instruments in future.

Instruments in force, under implementation or consideration

The current EU level instruments consist of those that aim to improve the functioning of the Schengen area and the customs union, such as the:

Schengen Information System (SIS) and the second generation Schengen Information System (SIS II), which is currently under development;
Eurodac system;
Visa Information System (VIS);
directive on the transmission of Advance Passenger Information (API);
Naples II Convention;
Customs Information System (CIS) and its Customs File Identification Database (FIDE).

There are also EU level instruments aimed at preventing and combating terrorism and other forms of serious cross-border crime, such as the:

framework decision on simplifying the exchange of information between law enforcement authorities;
decision on stepping up cross-border cooperation;
Data Retention Directive 2006/24/EC;
framework decisions on taking account of previous convictions in new criminal proceedings and on exchanging information from criminal records, including the European Criminal Records Information System (ECRIS) for the latter;
Council Decision 2000/642/JHA on exchanging information between EU countries’ Financial Intelligence Units;
decision on cooperation between Asset Recovery Offices (AROs);
Cybercrime Alert Platforms.

In addition, EU agencies and bodies have been established to assist EU countries in preventing and combating serious cross-border crime, such as the European Police Office (Europol) and the EU’s Judicial Cooperation Unit (Eurojust).

As to cooperation with non-EU countries to prevent and combat terrorism and other forms of serious transnational crime, the Commission has signed Passenger Name Record (PNR) agreements with the United States, Australia and Canada. However, the European Parliament is critical of the content of these agreements and has, therefore, requested the Commission to renegotiate them. The Commission has also signed an agreement with the United States on the transfer of financial messaging data (EU-US TFTO Agreement).

Instruments envisaged in the Stockholm Programme action plan

In its action plan on the Stockholm Programme, the Commission has committed to presenting in the course of 2011 three legislative proposals:

a PNR package;
an Entry/Exit System (EES) for non-EU country nationals entering the Union for stays of a maximum of three months;
a Registered Travellers Programme (RTP) for simplifying border checks for certain groups of frequent travellers from non-EU countries.

The Stockholm Programme action plan also includes initiatives that the Commission is to study, with a view to presenting a communication on their feasibility:

an EU Terrorist Finance Tracking Programme (EU TFTP), for facilitating data transfers from the EU to the United States;
an Electronic System of Travel Authorisations (ESTA), for facilitating the entry of non-EU nationals who are not subject to visa requirements;
a European Police Record Index System (EPRIS), for facilitating the location of information across the EU by law enforcement officers.

Analysis of instruments

Only six of the above mentioned instruments involve the collection and storage of personal data at EU level: SIS, VIS, Eurodac, CIS, Europol and Eurojust. The other instruments regulate the exchange or transfer of personal information that has been collected at national level. With the exception of SIS and VIS, these instruments have a single purpose. Similarly, the personal information collected may only be used for the single purpose defined by the instrument in question, except for that collected through SIS and VIS.

Access to information from instruments that aim at combating terrorism and serious crime is limited to the police and border control and customs authorities. Access to information from Schengen-related instruments is limited to immigration authorities and, in certain circumstances, to the police and border control and customs authorities. The information flow for centralised instruments is controlled by national interfaces and for decentralised instruments by national contact points or central coordinating units.

Set of core principles for future

There is a need to establish a set of core principles for future policy developments as well as for the evaluation of the current instruments. These should consist of substantive principles, such as:

the safeguarding of fundamental rights, especially of the right to privacy and personal data protection via “privacy by design”;
an assessment of the necessity of the new instrument in terms of its impact on an individual’s right to privacy and personal data protection;
compliance with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality;
management of risk via risk profiles.

The set of core principles should also consist of process-oriented principles, such as:

cost-effectiveness, taking into consideration existing instruments;
bottom-up policy design, taking into consideration the interests of end-users;
clear allocation of responsibilities, paying particular attention to governance structures;
reporting and review obligations to ensure the instruments serve the purposes they were designed for.

EU counter-terrorism policy

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EU counter-terrorism policy

Outline of the Community (European Union) legislation about EU counter-terrorism policy

Topics

These categories group together and put in context the legislative and non-legislative initiatives which deal with the same topic.

Justice freedom and security > Fight against terrorism

EU counter-terrorism policy

Document or Iniciative

Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council of 20 July 2010 – The EU Counter-Terrorism Policy: main achievements and future challenges [COM(2010) 386 final – Not published in the Official Journal].

Summary

The communication presents the main European Union (EU) level legislative and policy developments, as well as some of the future challenges, in the field of counter-terrorism. It forms a preparatory step in the EU’s internal security strategy, building on the Stockholm Programme’s counter-terrorism related measures. The communication focuses on the four strands identified in the EU counter-terrorism strategy:

Prevent

The framework decision on combating terrorism is the main EU level legal instrument for dealing with terrorist offences. Amended in 2008, it now also harmonises national provisions relating to the prevention aspects of the fight against terrorism, including terrorist use of the internet. The Commission has also launched a dialogue with law enforcement authorities and service providers to counter terrorist use of the internet. To facilitate this kind of public/private partnerships, a European Agreement Model is currently being developed.

Of the several important policies the EU has adopted in recent years to combat radicalisation and recruitment, the specific EU strategy is a key instrument. Action and implementation plans were approved in 2009 to further the objectives of this strategy. The Commission’s contribution to work in this field has included its communication concerning terrorist recruitment and support for the production of a number of related studies. Furthermore, it has set up a European Network of Experts on Radicalisation (ENER) to facilitate dialogue between academics and policy makers.

In the future, the most effective ways to counter radicalisation and recruitment must be identified more accurately. The related national policies must be assessed, to which end the Commission will launch a communication in 2011, which will also serve as a basis for updating the EU strategy. More effective approaches must also be put in place to counter terrorist use of the internet, including further support to national law enforcement authorities.

Protect

Great efforts have been made in recent years to improve border security, including the introduction of new technologies in the development of the integrated border management system and of biometric passports. The second generation Schengen Information System (SIS II) and the Visa Information System (VIS) are currently being developed. Cyber security is dealt with in the framework decision on attacks against information systems and the action plan to protect critical information infrastructure. To improve transport security, especially regarding civil aviation and maritime transport, an extensive legislative framework has been established. In these two fields, the Commission also closely cooperates with national administrations on a system of inspections of airports and port facilities.

In 2008, an EU action plan for enhancing the security of explosives was approved. The Commission is also working on proposals for measures that aim at improving control of access to precursor substances used for preparing explosives. Several programmes have also been established to support the development of security and counter-terrorism policies, such as the security research programme (as part of the Seventh Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development) and the European Programme for Critical Infrastructure (EPCIP). In relation to the latter, a directive on European critical infrastructures was adopted in 2008 as a first step in creating an EU-wide approach.

Future work must concentrate on improving transport security through the use of new technologies and on developing industrial security policy with focus on standardising and certifying security solutions. Efforts should also be made to ensure the effectiveness of security research policy, in particular by strengthening links between public sector users and the research community as well as technology providers and the industry.

Pursue

In recent years, several instruments relating to data gathering and exchanges have been adopted, such as the Data Retention Directive, the decision on stepping up cross-border cooperation and the framework decisions on simplifying the exchange of information between national law enforcement authorities and on the European evidence warrant. At the same time, improvements have been made to the functioning of Europol and to its cooperation with Eurojust.

The main legislative instrument dealing with the financing of terrorism is the directive on money laundering adopted in 2005. The same year, a regulation on controls of cash entering or leaving the EU was also adopted. There are also non-legislative measures to counter terrorist financing, such as the voluntary guidelines to address non-profit organisations’ vulnerability to abuse for terrorist financing purposes.

An assessment of the new legal instruments for exchanging information is currently underway and will be presented in a separate communication. The need for EU legislation on investigation techniques will also be assessed. In addition, there is the need to establish a methodology based on common parameters for threat assessments at EU level in order to ensure that counter-terrorism policy is adequately supported by evidence.

Respond

The EU Civil Protection Mechanism is the main instrument for responding to terrorist attacks. Additional EU level mechanisms include the Crisis Coordination Arrangements (CCA) and the ARGUS system, which aim at coordinating responses to crises. Europol also supports coordinated responses to terrorist incidents through its information exchange mechanisms.

The EU action plan on chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear security was adopted in 2009, with a view to better preparing and responding to incidents in which terrorists would obtain such materials. The Commission also provides support to victims of terrorist attacks, including financial support.

The EU civil protection policy is currently being evaluated to better prepare for the follow-up actions. An assessment of ways to reinforce coordination and cooperation to facilitate consular protection during crises is also underway. Furthermore, it is essential that the EU rapid response capacity be further developed on the basis of existing instruments.

Horizontal issues

The EU counter-terrorism strategy also includes horizontal issues that are relevant for its implementation:

respect for fundamental rights – the tools used to fight terrorism must comply with the Charter of Fundamental Rights;
cooperation with external partners – cooperation should be further developed through international organisations, such as the United Nations, and with non-EU countries, particularly the United States;
funding – the multi-annual financial frameworks (currently the Security and Safeguarding Liberties Programme) provide funding for counter-terrorism; the feasibility of creating an Internal Security Fund will be examined in future.

European Security Research and Innovation Agenda

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European Security Research and Innovation Agenda

Outline of the Community (European Union) legislation about European Security Research and Innovation Agenda

Topics

These categories group together and put in context the legislative and non-legislative initiatives which deal with the same topic.

Research and innovation > Research in support of other policies

European Security Research and Innovation Agenda

Document or Iniciative

Communication from the Commission of 21 December 2009 – “A European Security Research and Innovation Agenda – Commission’s initial position on ESRIF’s key findings and recommendations” [COM(2009) 691 final – Not published in the Official Journal].

Summary

In light of modern security concerns, the European Security Research and Innovation Forum (ESRIF) was established in 2007 to develop a European Security Research and Innovation Agenda (ESRIA). With a view to improving coherence at European Union (EU), national and regional levels, the agenda provides a common strategic roadmap for security research and innovation. This communication presents the Commission’s initial view on ESRIF’s key findings and recommendations for the agenda.

Societal security and resilience

The human and societal aspects of security must be at the heart of security research. The EU must strengthen the legal and ethical dimensions of all security solutions to guarantee the rights and freedoms of individuals, in particular as regards privacy. In addition, it must reinforce the societal dimension of security technologies to ensure that they allow societies to effectively respond to risks and losses (“societal resilience”).

Industrial policy

The EU security industry has previously suffered from the fragmentation of markets, which has led it to be nationally or even regionally oriented. To protect the interests of its citizens and provide for a competitive security industry, the EU needs to pursue a strong and independent technological and scientific base. It should aim for a leadership position in the global security market, endorsing the idea of a Lead Market Initiative (LMI) for the sector. To this end, the EU needs to develop an ambitious industrial policy that will:

overcome market fragmentation, by putting in place certification, validation and standardisation -mechanisms (including a “European Security Label”), harmonising the regulatory framework, and developing technical and organisational interoperability standards to improve exchanges of information, especially on cross-border security issues;
strengthen the industrial base, by mapping the competencies of the European Security Technological and Industrial Base (ESTIB), supporting innovation policy by bringing innovative security sectors into the LMI and accelerating pre-commercial procurement, promoting the take up of security issues already at the conception stage of new products/systems (“security by design”), and strengthening complementarity and cooperation between civil and defence technologies in specific areas.

Security research and development (R&D) roadmap

Since the thorough anticipation of future security threats is not possible, the EU should focus its security R&D on strengthening its ability to resist and recover from crises, both from the technological and societal points of view. Divided into five clusters, the ESRIA provides an integrative approach to R&D support for current security missions:

classic security cycle of preventing, protecting, preparing, responding and recovering;
countering of different means of attack;
securing critical assets/infrastructures;
securing identity, access and movement of people and goods;
cross-cutting enablers, in particular Information and Communication Technologies (ICT).

For future security missions, the R&D measures need to be further assessed. ESRIF recommends that particular attention is given to some research areas that were excluded from its mandate and that will likely increase in importance in future, in particular the external dimension of security. The Commission believes that further consideration also needs to be given to the inclusion of civil protection as well as conflict prevention and post crisis management into security R&D programmes.

For future solutions to correspond to the real needs of public and private end-users, they as well as supply and demand stakeholders must be consulted actively throughout the security research policy planning, execution and review cycles. Furthermore, ESRIF encourages the development of a strategic and coordinated approach to trans-European cooperation and the setting-up of an Internal Security Fund to provide resources for security R&D. Finally, education and training should be better used to raise public awareness of all security-related issues.

The role of customs in the integrated management of external borders

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The role of customs in the integrated management of external borders

Outline of the Community (European Union) legislation about The role of customs in the integrated management of external borders

Topics

These categories group together and put in context the legislative and non-legislative initiatives which deal with the same topic.

Justice freedom and security > Police and customs cooperation

The role of customs in the integrated management of external borders

Document or Iniciative

Communication of 24 April 2003 from the Commission to the Council, European Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee on the role of customs in the integrated management of external borders [COM(2003) 452 final – Official Journal C 96 of 21.4.2004]

Summary

The present customs controls applied to goods are not adequate to protect the Member States from the growing threats to the EU at its external borders. Chief among these are:

Criminal and terrorist threats

This category includes the introduction into the Community of prohibited goods such as explosives or nuclear, biological or chemical weapons, and also smuggling or trafficking of illegal goods such as drugs, cigarettes and counterfeit goods, often used to finance to finance terrorist organisations or organised crime.
Health and safety risks to consumers

This category covers the unauthorised import of contaminated goods, narcotics and anabolic substances, and medicines and consumer products that do not comply with Community safety standards.
Environmental and health risks

These include illegal trafficking of species of fauna and flora in danger of extinction, radioactive matter and risks associated with the undeclared introduction into Community territory of animal or vegetable species or products.

At present the measures, priorities, investment, equipment and resources used to combat these threats and protect the Community and its citizens differ from one Member State to the next. This means that security controls are neither harmonised nor uniform at Community level, and responses to threats at the external borders are sometimes slow. Common, integrated management of the external borders therefore needs to be established.

Customs operations need to be reorganised to increase the safety of goods. Hence the Communication proposes rationalising customs controls by identifying which ones could be carried out at internal borders to enable controls at external borders to focus on the goods that absolutely must be checked there for safety reasons.

The Commission proposes establishing a common approach to risk at the external borders. In the end this will mean all the authorities with responsibilities relating to the safety of goods (including customs, the police, consumer protection, health protection and environmental protection authorities) working together to establish priorities and define common risk profiles. The risk profiles can be used to identify the most relevant data for risk analyses.

In the long run this should also mean that traders will be able to electronically transmit all data on their goods to customs for initial identification of risks. The data should be supplied in electronic format to facilitate their transfer, evaluation and processing. Customs will then have to centralise the information and send it to the competent authorities. A single transmission channel will have to be set up for this purpose, and it should be possible to process the information on the basis of the profiles established by all the authorities concerned. Effective and rapid systems for information transmission between customs and the other relevant authorities will have to be set up and operated.

Because of their experience in identifying movements of goods, customs will have to cooperate more closely with the police in fraud investigations and have a more specific role in policing goods.

The material and human resources necessary to implement the approach will need to be available at any point along the external borders. Where bulky or particularly expensive equipment is involved, it may be found desirable to designate certain specialised border posts to control certain well-defined types of goods, and to provide them with the necessary special equipment. This would make it possible to spread equipment costs more equitably and to concentrate expertise at these specialised posts. However, such specialisation should not create an obstacle to legitimate trade by imposing additional costs for processing goods at posts far from their destinations.

The proposal presents initiatives which could be introduced for sharing data on goods moving from one country to another to allow more effective identification of high-risk traffic. This would allow the transfer of data received from the exporting country, where information is easier to locate and fuller, and so accelerate customs procedures without compromising security. The Community should promote this principle of sharing responsibility with its neighbours and main trade partners.

The Community should also step up export controls.

In the interests of risk management on its external borders, the Community should increase its cooperation with third countries and countries with which it shares borders.

Measures to support the new Member States should also be adopted, in particular under the Customs 2007 programme.

Action plan on the Stockholm Programme

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Action plan on the Stockholm Programme

Outline of the Community (European Union) legislation about Action plan on the Stockholm Programme

Topics

These categories group together and put in context the legislative and non-legislative initiatives which deal with the same topic.

Justice freedom and security > Judicial cooperation in criminal matters

Action plan on the Stockholm Programme

Document or Iniciative

Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions of 20 April 2010 – Delivering an area of freedom, security and justice for Europe’s citizens – Action Plan Implementing the Stockholm Programme [COM(2010) 171 final – Not published in the Official Journal].

Summary

The European Union’s (EU) priorities for developing an area of justice, freedom and security during the period 2010-14 are set out in the Stockholm Programme. This action plan aims to deliver those priorities as well as to prepare for future challenges both at European and global level.

Europe of rights

The action plan provides for measures to ensure the protection of fundamental rights. These consist of reinforcing data protection law through a new comprehensive legal framework, as well as of incorporating data protection into all EU policies, law enforcement, crime prevention and international relations. Actions are also intended to fight against all forms of discrimination, racism, xenophobia and homophobia. Particular attention is given to protecting the rights of the child and vulnerable groups, including victims of crime and terrorism. For the protection of the latter, the Commission will propose a comprehensive instrument and practical measures, including a European Protection Order. The Commission will also make legislative proposals regarding the rights of individuals in criminal proceedings and actions relating to detention. Furthermore, the action plan provides for measures to empower European citizens, in particular as regards the right to free movement, protection in non-EU countries and civic participation.

Europe of justice

In order to strengthen the European judicial area, the action plan sets out measures to further implement the principle of mutual recognition. This includes legislative proposals on obtaining and gathering of evidence, disqualifications and financial penalties in criminal matters. The Commission also intends to propose new legislation on civil matters, such as relating to divorce, and revise the regulation concerning judgements in civil and commercial matters. For the principle of mutual recognition to function effectively, the Commission will take actions to strengthen mutual trust. To this end, actions to develop common minimum standards in both criminal and civil law will also be proposed. In addition, for citizens to better benefit from the European judicial area, the Commission will propose actions to facilitate access to justice, especially in terms of legislation relating to civil status documents, and to support economic activity, such as legislative proposals on the enforcement of judgements. At the same time, the Commission intends to increase the EU’s international presence in the field of civil and criminal law, mainly through the negotiation of agreements and conventions with non-EU countries.

Europe that protects

To better protect citizens and tackle cross-border crime, the action plan provides for the drafting of an internal security strategy. The Commission also aims to improve the existing security tools, in particular those relating to the management of information flows, as well as to propose the take up of technological security tools, such as a European register of convicted non-EU nationals. In addition, the action plan provides for improved policies to fight cross-border crime, mainly better cooperation in European law enforcement, including between the European Police Office, Eurojust and the European external borders agency (Frontex), as well as better crime prevention. In order to protect against serious and organised crime, the action plan also provides for specific measures to fight crime, including legislative proposals on:

trafficking in human beings;
sexual exploitation of children and child pornography;
cyber-crime and network information security;
economic crime and corruption;
drugs;
terrorism.

The Commission also intends to reinforce the EU’s capacity to prevent, prepare for and respond to disasters, both man-made and natural. To this end, the action plan provides for measures that complement and improve EU disaster management.

Access to Europe

The Commission will take actions to further develop the integrated approach to managing the EU’s external borders. These include legislative proposals to modify Frontex, the Schengen Borders Code and the European Border Surveillance System (Eurosur). The Commission will also propose the setting up of an Entry Exit System (EES) and a Registered Traveller Programme (RTP). Furthermore, the Commission will continue with visa liberalisation by negotiating Visa Facilitation Agreements with non-EU countries, as well as with the launch of the Visa Information System (VIS).

Europe of solidarity

The Commission intends to pursue a dynamic and comprehensive immigration policy, which will consist of actions that:

further develop the EU Global Approach to Migration to increase cooperation with non-EU countries;
support migration to fulfil the needs of the EU countries’ labour-markets;
promote the integration and the rights of migrants;
tackle illegal migration through readmission agreements and return policies;
take into account the situation of unaccompanied minors.

The Commission also aims to pursue a common asylum policy to establish a common area of protection for asylum seekers through the sharing of responsibility by EU countries. The action plan also provides for a strengthened external dimension through cooperation with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the development of the EU Resettlement Programme as well as of new regional protection programmes.

Europe in a globalised world

The action plan reiterates the interconnection between the internal and external dimension of justice, freedom and security policies. Consequently, it provides for actions that reinforce the external dimension, in particular for better cooperation and information sharing between EU countries. In addition, the Commission aims at taking into account the external dimension in its relations with non-EU countries, including in a variety of agreements and partnership arrangements. The action plan also provides for continued support for the Council of Europe conventions on trafficking in human beings, data protection, protection of children, cybercrime and corruption, as well as for the Hague Conference on Private International Law.

The way forward

In order to transform the political priorities established by the Stockholm Programme into concrete actions and results, the action plan provides measures for:

evaluating justice, freedom and security policies and mechanisms;
training legal and security professionals as well as judicial and law enforcement authorities;
public awareness-raising activities;
dialogue with civil society;
new financial programmes.

Another Normative about Action plan on the Stockholm Programme

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These categories group together and put in context the legislative and non-legislative initiatives which deal with the same topic

Justice freedom and security > Free movement of persons asylum and immigration

Action plan on the Stockholm Programme

Document or Iniciative

Summary

Europe of rights

Europe of justice

Europe that protects

trafficking in human beings;
sexual exploitation of children and child pornography;
cyber-crime and network information security;
economic crime and corruption;
drugs;
terrorism.

Access to Europe

Europe of solidarity

The Commission intends to pursue a dynamic and comprehensive immigration policy, which will consist of actions that:

further develop the EU Global Approach to Migration to increase cooperation with non-EU countries;
support migration to fulfil the needs of the EU countries’ labour-markets;
promote the integration and the rights of migrants;
tackle illegal migration through readmission agreements and return policies;
take into account the situation of unaccompanied minors.

Europe in a globalised world

The way forward

In order to transform the political priorities established by the Stockholm Programme into concrete actions and results, the action plan provides measures for:

evaluating justice, freedom and security policies and mechanisms;
training legal and security professionals as well as judicial and law enforcement authorities;
public awareness-raising activities;
dialogue with civil society;
new financial programmes.